PROXY ACCESS FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS
JACK GRAVELLE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

United States economic turmoil has raised questions about the failure of boards of
directors to oversee management, focus on shareholder interests, and accept accountability
for poor decisions.1 One solution that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
has embraced is a more open process of nominating directors.2 This approach, known as
shareholder “proxy access” has been debated for decades, but with each swell of interest,
proponents have agreed that proxy access should only be available to large shareholders.3
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See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairwoman, Address to Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue – 2009
Conference (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch091709mls.htm (suggesting
that boards of directors have failed to question the decisions of management to accept risk and have failed to
understand the risks taken).
1

Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule), Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule)]; Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations
(Proposed Rule), Securities Act Release No. 9046, Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act
Release No. 28,765, 96 SEC Docket 9, at 7 (proposed June 10, 2009) [hereinafter Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Proposed Rule)]. A more open process is also supported by Congress as evident by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), which was
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. Section 971(b) of the Act states: “[t]he Commission may
issue rules permitting the use by a shareholder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of securities
for the purpose of nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer.”
2

Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, 81 SEC Docket 770 (Oct. 14, 2003). Of recent SEC proposals, the most generous would
have limited proxy access to shareholders that own at least one percent of a corporation‟s total shares issued,
depending on the size of the corporation. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Proposed Rule), at 43.
The current standard of proxy access is that no shareholder of any size has access to a corporation‟s proxy
statement. No Commission proposal or recommendation in support of proxy access has ever supported proxy
access for all shareholders. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule); Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment Company Act
Release No. 28,075, 92 SEC Docket 256 (Dec. 6, 2007); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of
Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 91 SEC Docket 575
(July 27, 2007); Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326,
Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 52 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992); Exchange Act Release No.
13901, Investment Company Act Release No. 9914, 12 SEC Docket 1656 (Aug. 29, 1977); Re-Examination of
Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and
Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 13482, Investment Company Act Release No.
9740, 12 SEC Docket 267 (Apr. 28,1977); Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347,
Investment Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). The Commission has considered
some aspect of shareholder access to the corporation‟s proxy statement in 1942, 1977, 1992, 2003, 2007, and
2009. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Proposed Rule) at 8 n.27, 21 n.73.
3
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Proxy access refers to the right of a shareholder, as partial owner of a public
corporation, to propose a nominee for the board of directors that the corporation must
include in its proxy statement.4 Public corporations submit proxy statements to their
shareholders to solicit votes on matters that require shareholder approval, such as the
election of directors, because it is not practical for all shareholders to attend a corporation‟s
shareholder meeting.5 Currently, a corporation is not required to include a shareholder‟s
nominee for the board, or any other shareholder proposal, in the corporation‟s proxy
statement. The fact that larger shareholders could soon be permitted to include director
nominees in a proxy statement prepared by the corporation at the corporation‟s expense and
effort is a seminal event that exemplifies the increasing power of shareholders in general.6
Despite this proposed shift in shareholder power, director accountability to
shareholders is best achieved by proxy access for all shareholders, a solution that would
allow all shareholders, regardless of the size of their interests, to nominate directors to be
included in the corporation‟s proxy statement.7 Every shareholder should be permitted to
nominate directors that appear in the corporation‟s proxy statement, regardless of how many
shares the shareholder owns, because every shareholder confers authority on the board of
directors to manage the corporation.8 The SEC‟s most recent proxy access rule is wellintentioned but irrationally distinguishes between large and small shareholders and would
better accomplish proxy access goals by offering the same proxy access to all shareholders.
Other than to appease proxy access opponents, there is no sensible reason for distinguishing
between large and small shareholders with respect to proxy access, nor is there a reasonable
way to determine at what percentage ownership a shareholder should be granted proxy
access.
Proxy access is not a new idea. When SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro formally
recommended the preliminary version of the SEC‟s new shareholder proxy access rule on

See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on
E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 479 (2008).
4

5

Id.

6

See id. at 484.

The SEC‟s new proxy access rule distinguishes between shareholders based on ownership size and other
factors beyond the scope of this essay such as how long a shareholder has held shares. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 24. See infra note 33.
7

Proxy access for all shareholders is an unconventional approach. The SEC‟s most recent proposal of proxy
access for shareholders large enough to control at least one percent of a corporation with $700 million in net
assets resulted in over 500 comment letters spanning two comment periods, the majority of which expressed
opposition, a Congressional response, and a lawsuit by the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.
See Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations,
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml#33-9086; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Brief for Petitioners, Business Roundtable
v. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2010). The proxy access rule as passed allows proxy access for
shareholders owning at least three percent of the voting power of a corporation for three years. Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 24-25.
8

2011]

PROXY ACCESS FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS

175

May 20, 2009, she quoted language from a 1977 SEC Release that cites the same need for
proxy access as exists today:9
Recent disclosures concerning a wide variety of questionable and illegal
corporate practices, accomplished in certain instances with the knowledge
and participation of top corporate management, have served to focus public
attention on the subject of corporate accountability. A number of
proposals designed to achieve a new “corporate governance” have been
suggested, including . . . providing mechanisms to assure a higher level of
management accountability to shareholders through revisions of the
Commission‟s proxy rules.10
Over three decades later, questionable corporate practices continue with the
knowledge and participation of top corporate management, and the SEC continues to look
to proxy access as a way to improve management accountability.11 And with good reason,
because despite the fact that corporate decisions are ultimately the responsibility of the
board of directors, it is the shareholders who have the statutory power to hold the members
of the board accountable in one significant way: by voting them out.12
When a corporation makes bad decisions that are neither illegal nor negligent, it is
the shareholders who are responsible for holding the decision-makers accountable.13
Lawmakers, as tempted as they may be to ensure bad decisions do not repeat, are charged
Re-Examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Securities Act Release No. 9740, Exchange Act Release
No. 13,482, Investment Company Act Release No. 9740, 12 SEC Docket, 267(Apr. 28, 1977). The corporate
scandals alluded to were evidenced by more than 350 public disclosures in a two-year period regarding bribes,
kickbacks, illegal political contributions, and improper accounting practices. Id. at 2 n.1.
9

Mary Schapiro, SEC Chairwoman, Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 2009/spch052009mls.htm.
10

Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 7-8. Perhaps the two most controversial
categories of presumably good-faith decisions made by boards of directors in recent times are: (1) exorbitant
executive compensation for poor performance (see, e.g., Robert Daines, Vinay B. Nair, & Lewis Kornhauser, The
Good, the Bad and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill (NYU Pollack Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper No. 04-035,
2005), available at http//hdl.handle.net/2451/25977 (discussing high pay for poor performance at Disney, AT&T,
Exxon and Verizon among other corporations)), and (2) imprudent investments in asset-backed securities and
credit-default swaps (see, e.g., Louise Story & Ben White, The Road to Lehman’s Failure was Littered with Lost Chances,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008 (discussing the collapse of Lehman Brothers following investments in mortgage-backed
securities); Mary Williams Walsh, Inquiry Asks Why AIG Paid Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009 (discussing the
bailout of American International Group following investments in credit-default swaps)).
11

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (2007) (“The shareholders may remove one or more directors with or
without cause unless the articles of incorporation provide that directors may be removed only for cause.”);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he powers of corporate democracy are
at [the shareholders‟] disposal to turn the board out.”).
12

Because the Business Judgment Rule prevents courts from second-guessing such director decisions, only the
shareholders are in a position to effect change. See In re Caremark Int‟l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through „stupid‟ to „egregious‟ or „irrational‟, provides no
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”).
13
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with facilitating a legal system that compels director liability for illegal or negligent acts, not
director accountability for poor outcomes of good faith decisions. Because it would be
unfair and impractical to hold directors personally liable for poor business decisions,
lawmakers instead provide tools for shareholders to use to impose director accountability. 14
One accountability tool is proxy access.15
This essay first discusses the regulation of proxy access and the SEC‟s new proxy
access rule, which requires a corporation to include certain large shareholders‟ nominees for
the board in the corporation‟s proxy statement. It next discusses why proxy access should
be afforded to all shareholders, not just large shareholders, and concludes by explaining why
opposition to proxy access is misguided.

II.

NEW SEC REGULATION OF PROXY ACCESS

The SEC regulates the solicitation of proxies using rules promulgated under Section
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.16 Proxies can be solicited for many reasons,
including the election of directors, by anyone willing to follow the requirements of
Regulation 14A, which requires a specific presentation of information to shareholders.17
Typically, the board of directors solicits proxies on behalf of the corporation and at the
corporation‟s expense, but other parties may do so as well if they are willing to bear the
cost.18 The corporation‟s proxy statement is a solicitation of votes, not a ballot, and pending

See David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 225 (2009); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (“To employ a different rule–one that
permitted an „objective‟ evaluation of the decision–would expose directors to substantive second guessing by illequipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests.”).
14

A competing, yet effective tool cited by opponents of proxy access proposals is the notion that shareholders
can “vote with their feet” and sell their shares in any corporation they do not feel is managed effectively. See, e.g.,
Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 631-32, n.141 (2007) (citing Carol
Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too
Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 406 (1994)).
15

16

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1-240.14b-2 (2010).

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 4, 5, 101 (2010). Rule 14a-8 provides the process by which shareholders can submit
proposals to be included in the corporation‟s proxy statement and pending enforcement of the new proxy access
rule, allows a corporation to exclude proposals that relate “to a nomination or an election for membership on the
corporation‟s board of directors.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). The new version of Rule 14a-8 offers more
specific examples of the types of nomination/election proposals that may be excluded. Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 227-28. Importantly, the new version of Rule 14a-8 would no longer allow
a corporation to exclude from proxy materials proposals that seek to establish a procedure under a corporation‟s
governing documents for the inclusion of one or more shareholder director nominees in the corporation‟s proxy
materials. Id. at 84, n.223; see infra note 36.
17

See generally Gregory S. Meyer, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (May 11, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1085734/000101968710001755/meyer_def.htm (soliciting votes of
shareholders of Blockbuster Inc. on behalf of Gregory S. Meyer), The cost of a proxy fight can be millions of
dollars depending on legal costs and the number of shareholders solicited. See, e.g., Ian Fried, Costs Mount in HP
Proxy Fight, CNET NEWS, Mar. 13, 2002, available at http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-859261.html (suggesting
that corporations can spend $5-10 per voter solicited by telephone and $2.5-3 million total in mailing costs).
18
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enforcement of the new proxy access rule, there is no mechanism by which any shareholder
can cause a corporation to solicit votes for the shareholder‟s nominees for director.19
On June 10, 2009, the SEC proposed a new proxy access rule for larger
shareholders that was finalized on August 25, 2010.20 To qualify for proxy access, a
shareholder or group of shareholders must own at least three percent of a public
corporation‟s voting power.21 Additionally, and among other requirements, the shareholder
or group of shareholders must have held the shares for at least three years with no intent to
effect a change of control of the corporation.22 The new rule allows these “significant, longterm holders” to include no more than one nominee or the number of nominees that
represents 25% of the corporation‟s board, whichever is greater, in the corporation‟s proxy
statement, thereby avoiding the prohibitive cost of preparing and sending proxy materials on
their own behalf.23
On September 29, 2010, the Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce
sued the SEC in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
petitioned the SEC to stay the effect of its newly adopted proxy access rule pending the
outcome of the lawsuit.24 The SEC granted the stay on October 4, 2010, to avoid any
regulatory uncertainty while the rule is being challenged.25 The Business Roundtable and
U.S. Chamber of Commerce allege, among other claims, that the SEC did not properly
consider certain costs of the new rule, that the rule is arbitrary and capricious in violation of

This distinction between a ballot and a proxy statement may make sense given the logic of the proxy rules, but
the complicated and expensive process of proxy solicitation has effectively caused the proxy statement to become
a ballot that offers a limited choice between the corporation‟s slate of directors or withholding one‟s votes. See
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Proposed Rule) at 15-16 (explaining that dissatisfied shareholders
seeking redress from the proxy rules have three choices under the proxy rules: (1) launch a proxy fight, (2) submit
non-election related proposals via Rule 14a-8, or (3) withhold their votes against one or more directors). See supra
text accompanying note 17.
19

20

Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 7.

Id. at 75. When the financial reform bill was being negotiated, Senator Christopher Dodd proposed mandating
a minimum ownership requirement of five percent, but ultimately, discretion was left to the SEC to determine
the rules by which proxy access would be granted. Victoria McGrane, US Sen Dodd Pushes Scaled-Back Proxy Access
Rule, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100616714740.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines.
21

22

Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 114.

23

Id. at 107, 138-39.

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8; In the Matter of the Motion of Business Roundtable and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America for Stay of Effect of Commission‟s Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations Rules, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act. Release No. 63,031, Investment Company
Act Release No. 29,456, File No. S7-10-09 (Oct. 4, 2010).
24

See supra note 24. For an analysis of how the stay may have provided a research opportunity to determine how
financial markets view proxy access, see Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser, & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder
Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge, (Harv. Bus. School, Working Paper No.
11-052, 2010).
25
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the Administrative Procedures Act, and that the rule violates the First Amendment.26 Given
the opposition to proxy access, it is doubtful that any rule that grants some level of proxy
access to shareholders, no matter how judiciously crafted, would have avoided a similar suit.

III.

PROXY ACCESS FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS

This essay argues that proxy access for all shareholders would (1) avoid the arbitrary
determination of what size shareholder deserves proxy access; (2) reinforce the state-granted
power that all shareholders have to choose directors; (3) empower directors through
legitimate director elections; (4) increase director accountability, making directors more
responsive to all shareholder concerns; (5) reduce withhold campaigns; (6) diminish conflicts
of interest between retail and institutional shareholders; and (7) help determine whether
shareholders truly want empowerment.
The SEC touts the benefits of removing obstacles to the basic shareholder right to
nominate and elect directors, and yet the new rule limits proxy access to a select group of
shareholders holding a certain percentage of a corporation‟s shares.27 This approach
irrationally distinguishes between small shareholders and large shareholders regarding the
right of shareholders to nominate directors. This distinction is reasonable with respect to
director elections and occurs without being mandated by statute because the size of a
shareholder‟s interest determines the shareholder‟s power to elect directors: bigger
shareholders by definition have more votes. Greater ownership logically confers greater
power to influence the corporation. But with respect to director nominations, the distinction
between small shareholders and larger shareholders has no basis other than to appease proxy
access opponents.28
The power of a shareholder to nominate a candidate for director is similar to the
many other rights and powers shareholders possess, such as the right to receive an annual
report or attend the annual meeting of shareholders.29 These rights should not be limited to
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8, at 2. The SEC responded to the alleged violations of law on January 19,
2011, and oral argument occurred on April 7, 2011. Brief of Respondent, SEC, No.10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18,
2011).
26

Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 35; Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Proposed Rule) at 13.
27

The SEC justifies an ownership threshold for proxy access on the grounds “that it is appropriate to take a
measured approach that balances competing interests and seeks to ensure investor protection.” Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 72, 80. No explanation is offered for why three percent is the
ideal ownership threshold, other than the SEC‟s belief that higher thresholds would be too difficult to meet and
lower thresholds might result in more frequent election contests, which the SEC fears would be costly to
corporations. Id. at 83-84.
28

Most state statutes do not specifically grant shareholders the power to nominate directors but rather grant
shareholders the power to elect directors, which necessitates a nomination. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §
141 (2009); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.02-8.04 (2007). All shareholders of a class or series have the same rights
with respect to the election of directors because all shares of a class or series are equal. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 6.01 (“Except to the extent varied as permitted by this section, all shares of a class or series must have terms,
including preferences, rights and limitations, that are identical with those of other shares of the same class or
series.”). Generally, a corporation‟s constituent documents are silent regarding how directors will be nominated
and do not limit valid nominations to those received from larger shareholders.
29
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shareholders of a certain size without a compelling justification. No such justification exists
with respect to proxy access because the benefits of proxy access for larger shareholders
apply equally to all shareholders, and the detriments of proxy access argued by opponents
are unfounded regardless of the size of shareholder for which proxy access is granted.
Proxy access for all shareholders would eliminate the need to determine the
percentage of ownership a shareholder must possess to enjoy proxy access. The SEC‟s
attempt to make this determination strengthens the power to choose directors for only a
small percentage of shareholders.30 Additionally, the distinction does not comport with the
SEC‟s stated goal “to improve the corporate proxy process so that it functions, as nearly as
possible, as a replacement for an actual in-person meeting of shareholders.”31 The proxy
process cannot function as a replacement for a shareholder meeting if all but the largest
shareholders are denied access. Corporations do not limit annual meeting attendance,
participation, nomination procedures, etc. to larger shareholders.32 A rational investor would
not tolerate such a distinction.33
Proxy access for all shareholders would restore a principle of corporate law that has
been unintentionally distorted by the proxy rules: shareholders as owners are vested with the
power to choose directors to manage the corporation through a process of nomination and
election.34 State corporate law grants power to the shareholders to choose directors to

See Ian Salisbury, Proxy-Access Change Could be Muted, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010 (explaining that the majority of
large corporations do not have shareholders with a five percent stake, which was the upper ownership threshold
of the original SEC proxy access proposal, and pension funds rarely achieve ownership near five percent, even
when combined with other pension funds). See infra text accompanying note 86.
30

Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Proposed Rule) at 9; see also Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Final Rule) at 9.
31

Given that many SEC rules exist to ensure investors in a corporation‟s shares are treated equally, corporations
resist distinguishing between holders of the same type of shares. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2010)
(providing that in a tender offer the holders of the same type of shares must be treated equally, and the highest
consideration paid to any one shareholder must be paid to all shareholders); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-11 (2010)
(providing that in a tender offer the bidder must offer the same form and amount of consideration to
shareholders in both the initial and subsequent offering period).
32

Legislation of proxy access requires consideration of numerous potential stock ownership distinctions in
addition to the question of minimum ownership. For example, should there be a minimum holding period to
allow shareholders proxy access? Should directors elected via proxy access rules be required to own stock in the
corporation? Should long-term shareholders with small holdings be treated the same as large shareholders?
Should there be a limit on the number of nominees a shareholder can propose in the corporation‟s proxy
statement? Should shareholders be permitted to use proxy access to effect a change of control? These
considerations are of less importance than ownership distinctions because any limitations imposed would
presumably apply to all shareholders as a procedural qualification, not as a substantive qualification that can only
be satisfied by shareholders of a certain size. With respect to change-of-control issues, the SEC rightfully asserts
that “an election contest conducted by a shareholder to change the control of the issuer or to gain more than a
limited number of seats” should not be “funded out of corporate assets.” Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Proposed Rule) at 74-75; Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 139.
33

See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (2007) (“each corporation must have a board of directors”); id. §
8.03(c) (“Directors are elected at the first annual shareholders‟ meeting and at each annual meeting thereafter”);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2009).
34
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ensure proper management of the corporation.35 This power to choose directors was
effectively transferred from shareholders to a corporation‟s current management when
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act governing proxy solicitation was enacted without a
mechanism to allow shareholders to include director nominees in the corporation‟s proxy
statement.36
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was designed to ensure certain detailed
information is provided to shareholders when soliciting their vote, not to impede
shareholders‟ selection of directors.37 Proxy access for all shareholders would remove what
has become a barrier to the fundamental shareholder right to choose directors.38 Given that
general corporate law provides no distinction among shareholders based on the number of
shares owned other than increased voting power, proxy access for all shareholders would
ensure that every owner is able to nominate candidates for consideration by the
shareholders.39
Proxy access for all shareholders would give shareholders a significant opportunity
to influence board membership, which would bring more legitimacy to director elections.
And, if directors are freely nominated and elected by the shareholders, then directors will be
more empowered to ignore unhelpful shareholder proposals.40 State corporate law provides
See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2071, 2082 (2010).
35

See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Proposed Rule) at 8 n.25 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 14 (1934)) for the idea that despite not foreseeing the likelihood of the proxy statement to
wrest power from the shareholders, Congress wanted to prevent the frustration of the “free exercise of the
voting rights of stockholders.”
36

EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS,
DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, § 15.15 (2005) (summarizing the purpose of the proxy rules).
37

See supra text accompanying note 29. The power to choose directors includes both the power to nominate and
the power to elect because one without the other would be ineffective. See Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (Final Rule) at 9-10.
38

The SEC‟s new proxy access rule amends Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to enable shareholders to require
corporations to include in the corporate proxy statement proposals to amend governing documents regarding
nomination procedures or related disclosures that do not conflict with the new proxy access rule. Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 227. Similarly, such amendments could be permitted under a
proxy-access-for-all-shareholders system if not in conflict with the notion that any shareholder should be
permitted to nominate director candidates. One important goal of proxy access for all shareholders is to decrease
the nominating power of current management relative to the shareholders. Because proxy access for all
shareholders protects the fundamental right of shareholders to elect directors, there should be no mechanism by
which shareholders could compel a corporation to opt out of proxy access requirements. See Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329, 352 (2010) (supporting an opt-out
process with necessary safeguards); Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Final Rule) at 17 (“Rights,
including shareholder rights, are artifacts of law, and in the realm of corporate governance some rights cannot be
bargained away but rather are imposed by statute”).
39

One such unhelpful shareholder proposal is say-on-pay, which requires that a corporation seek an advisory
shareholder vote on compensation. Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Compensation & the Obama
Plan, 85 IND. L.J. 491, 543-45 (2010). Opponents argue say-on-pay proposals are ineffective because
shareholders vote against executive compensation programs for differing reasons, and there is no way for a board
to discern which aspects of compensation are opposed by the shareholders or how to craft acceptable
compensation. Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock – Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L.
REV. 419, 423 (2010). Say-on-pay proposals generally come from shareholders, not directors, and received
40
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that shareholders elect directors to manage a corporation because this is a more effective
management system than vesting routine management in the shareholders themselves.41 A
corporation would be immobilized if decisions that are now made by the board of directors
had to be made by the shareholders. But the current system of voting for directors is an
exercise in inevitability in that the shareholders‟ choice is between the company-selected slate
of directors and nobody.42 Proxy access for all shareholders would create an open director
nomination process resulting in directors with a mandate to manage the corporation and to
combat inappropriate shareholder influence.43
Proxy access for all shareholders would cause directors to be more accountable to
the shareholders, making a corporation more responsive to shareholder concerns.44
Directors that do not have to compete for their board positions are being allowed to govern
without an important incentive to further shareholder goals.45 Proxy access for all
shareholders would likely result in more director nominations by shareholders than will
result under the new proxy access rule.46
As more shareholder-nominated directors win seats on boards, those directors are
less likely than board-nominated directors to be seen as divisive.47 Currently, proxy contests
majority support at 22 corporations in 2009, which was twice as many as in 2008. RISKMETRICS GROUP, A New
Voice in Governance: Global Policymakers Shape the Road to Reform, RISKMETRICS GROUP POSTSEASON REPORT, at 4
(Oct. 2009). If directors felt they were elected with a mandate following open and fierce nominations, they
would have more power to ignore proposals such as advisory compensation votes. Unfortunately, such votes are
now required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 792 (2007). See Charlestown Boot
& Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85 (N.H. 1880) (stating that the business of every corporation must be
managed by the directors, not the shareholders); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) (“All corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed
by or under the direction of, its board of directors.”).
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returns and forcing directors to adopt too short a time horizon for decision-making”). As the influence of proxy
advisory firms such as RiskMetrics has grown, shareholder influence over the board of directors has also
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voting for directors, and removal of staggered boards. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 987, 1006, 1036 (2010). At some point shareholder influence must give way to the trust that is implicit in
a fiduciary relationship. For example, the board of directors sets its own compensation, which is a clear conflict
of interest, but that does not mean fairness requires shareholder voting on specific levels of board compensation.
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are contentious, but if shareholder-nominated directors become more common, their
presence on a board has less potential to be factious.48
Because proxy access for all shareholders will result in more nominations,
shareholders will be less likely to engage in withhold campaigns.49 Withhold campaigns are
often supported by institutional or activist shareholders seeking to embarrass a board
nominee in an uncontested election by encouraging other shareholders to withhold votes for
the nominee.50 In an uncontested election where directors are elected by a plurality, a
withhold campaign cannot defeat a nominee because only one vote is required to ensure
election.51 A withhold campaign is considered successful if it results in a high percentage of
votes withheld even though the director is still elected.52 But if all shareholders had the
benefit of proxy access, shareholders might feel pressure to directly effect corporate change
by nominating their own candidate instead of attempting to indirectly effect change by
encouraging a director to resign as a result of a successful withhold campaign.53
Finally, proxy access for all shareholders diminishes conflicting interests that exist
between retail shareholders and institutional shareholders. For example, retail shareholders
tend to hold smaller ownership stakes and may be more tolerant of risk-taking by a
corporation than large institutional shareholders that are not as likely to be diversified across
an industry.54 All shareholders make investment decisions for a variety of reasons and seek
representatives on the board of directors in their own best interests, which may be
inapposite to other investors.55 Proxy fights are waged by shareholders in pursuit of these

48

See id.

See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 649, 660 (2009) (discussing the highly publicized withhold campaign against Disney CEO Michael Eisner in
2004); Kaja Whitehouse, CEO Compensation Survey (A Special Report)--Stiffed Board: Shareholders Angry About Executive
Pay Are Targeting the People Responsible: Directors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at R4 (discussing a withhold campaign
against directors of Home Depot).
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Martin Lipton, Shareholder Activism and the “Eclipse of the Public Corporation,” Keynote Address at the
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(Feb.
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2007),
available
at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/02/ 20070210%20Lipton%20Address.pdf.
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interests, often with no regard for the governance goals of fellow shareholders.56 Due to
cost, retail shareholders are less likely to engage in a proxy fight to obtain representation on
the board of directors, but proxy access for all shareholders would allow retail shareholders
to increase their ability relative to institutional shareholders to solicit votes for
representation.57 Alternatively, the SEC‟s new rule that grants proxy access to only large
shareholders confers more power on institutional shareholders in obtaining board
representation at the expense of retail shareholders, a result that is counter to the SEC‟s
stated goal of protecting all investors, irrespective of the size of their ownership interests.58

IV.

ANCILLARY EFFECTS OF PROXY ACCESS FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS

In addition to improving board accountability and aligning board and shareholder
interests, proxy access for all shareholders may also have positive effects on how investors
and policymakers conceive of ideal corporate management. For example, proxy access for
all shareholders will help establish whether shareholders prefer board entrenchment, the idea
that directors purposely adopt governance policies to thwart their removal from the board.59
If proxy access for all shareholders emerges as the best way for shareholders to effect board
turnover, and yet board turnover does not increase, this will suggest that shareholders are
comfortable with board entrenchment. Proponents of proxy access argue that board
entrenchment should be discouraged because it perverts the power of shareholders to elect
directors.60 Conversely, board entrenchment other than to avoid an acquisition may be
neither bad nor good, but merely the result of shareholder voting. It may be that
shareholders have a choice to support board entrenchment or to take steps to elect new
directors.61 Just because shareholders do not regularly replace current directors does not
mean board turnover should be encouraged.62
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Furthermore, proxy access for all shareholders will help establish whether
shareholders want empowerment. If shareholders do not use their newfound power to
nominate more directors, then arguably, shareholders do not need or want further voting
empowerment.63
Retail shareholders, for example, may not want more voting
empowerment, as evidenced by the fact that they largely do not vote on shareholder
proposals, including the election of directors.64 Similarly, larger institutional shareholders
may enjoy the power to effect corporate change by threatening to nominate candidates for
the board, but may be less likely to actually follow through on an attempt to replace a
director.65

V.

OPPOSITION TO PROXY ACCESS

Opponents of the new proxy access rule, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and the Business Roundtable, also undoubtedly oppose proxy access for all shareholders. 66
Opponents argue that allowing proxy access (1) will cost too much,67 (2) will deter qualified
individuals from serving as directors,68 (3) will cause the election of unqualified or activist
directors,69 (4) is better left to the states,70 and (5) will exceed the SEC‟s statutory power,71
among other claims.72
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395 (1983)
(discussing rational shareholder apathy).
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Estimates of the cost of proxy access to a corporation are unreliable because most
data regarding the expense of defending or engaging in a proxy contest measures cost in the
context of a hostile acquisition where participants have an incentive to spend whatever is
necessary to solicit votes.73 Such proxy contests often include the cost of hiring a proxy
solicitor. The cost to a corporation for simply including a nominee‟s name and qualifications
description in proxy materials is significantly less than the cost of hiring a proxy solicitor to
request votes on behalf of the individual nominated.74 It essentially costs nothing for a
corporation to include additional names on a proxy card, which could even be distributed
electronically.75
Proxy access for all shareholders is unlikely to deter qualified individuals from
serving on the board of directors. Qualified directors will continue to have the benefit of
indemnification and insurance protections that a corporation provides, and compensation
and prestige will continue to make directorships attractive at many corporations.76
The worry that activist shareholders will nominate unqualified directors is
unwarranted, assuming other shareholders will not be so naïve as to elect unqualified
directors.77 Concerns that unqualified directors will be elected can be characterized as
concerns that shareholders are potentially incompetent or irrational.78 To ensure some level
of competence, current management could suggest amendments to a corporation‟s bylaws to
impose minimum qualifications for nominees.79 And, even if a rogue director were to hijack
a board, ill intentions would be tempered by fiduciary duties, statutory prohibitions, and the
will of the other directors.

implementation costs will outweigh the benefits), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=470121. Whether the SEC has authority to implement proxy access is a legitimate
practical concern that is of less importance in an essay about why proxy access for all shareholders is beneficial,
not how it should be implemented, and of even less importance following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which specifically grants authority to the SEC to pursue proxy
access. See supra text accompanying note 2.
For a complete list of all arguments discussed in comment letters to the SEC‟s most recent proposal, see THE
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72

73

Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 45 (2003).

74

See Fried, supra note 18.

See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-16 (2010). The SEC‟s e-proxy rules provide that a corporation that delivers notice of the
availability of proxy materials to its shareholders does not need to deliver paper copies unless specifically
requested by a shareholder.
75

Carol J. Loomis, Board Pay: Unchecked and Out of Hand, FORTUNE, Jan. 15, 2010, available at
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Finally, proxy access for all shareholders will not impede the states‟ ability to
continue to be a laboratory for limiting or expanding shareholder rights.80 States‟ rights
advocates should be championing a form of proxy access that would relieve states of federal
restrictions that have been placed on the fundamental right to choose directors.81
Opponents claim proxy access creates a right that does not exist.82 On the contrary, proxy
access for all shareholders removes impediments to the right to elect directors that exists in
every state.83 It is contradictory that states‟ rights advocates support a free market for
investment but are opposed to a free market for director nominations.84

VI.

CONCLUSION

If the SEC‟s recent rule providing proxy access for large shareholders survives legal
challenge, it will improve the power of large shareholders to hold the board accountable for
oversight and management. After so many decades of proxy access debate, enactment of the
new rule seems to have been inevitable given recent support for proxy access for large
shareholders from the White House, the SEC, and certain key members of Congress.85
However, the logic of how the new proxy access rule applies to different shareholders is
inconsistent. If proxy access will benefit large shareholders, it would also benefit all
shareholders regardless of size.86
In supporting the SEC commissioners‟ passing of the proxy access rule by a divided
3-2 vote on August 25, 2010, Chairwoman Schapiro stated that long-term significant
shareholders deserve a means to nominate candidates to the boards of the corporations they
own.87 In recognition of the power of proxy access, she continued: “I have great faith in the
collective wisdom of shareholders to determine which competing candidates will best fulfill
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Delaware and North
Dakota have amended their corporate codes to allow shareholders access to the corporate proxy statement under
some circumstances, and the American Bar Association has adopted similar changes to the Model Business
Corporation Act. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Proposed Rule), at 21 n.70 (citing DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009) and N.D. Cent. Code § 10-35-08 (2009)).
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the responsibilities of serving as a director.”88 Her statements summarize a guiding principle
for proxy access: as owners, shareholders deserve the unencumbered right to nominate
directors, and as significant as this power may be, it is moderated by the fact that no director
competing for a position on the board can be elected without the collective support of the
shareholders. All shareholders are owners of the corporation; all shareholders have the
power to elect directors; and all shareholders deserve the means to nominate candidates to
the boards of the corporations they own.
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